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According to the essential facilities doctrine, competition law re-
quires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the ”Bron-
ner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only appli-
cable when an infrastructural duopoly is non-viable.
This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare
point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly
protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring
too much investments from the entrant in moderately mature markets.
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The starting-point for the large literature on the optimal regulation of bottle-
necks is the following question: Given that we want to regulate an industry,
what is the optimal regulation? A potentially equally interesting question,
but one which has received much less interest among economists, is the fol-
lowing: When is it optimal to regulate and industry, given that we can impose
fair and non-discriminatory access pricing if the industry is regulated?
One of the most contested elements of competition (antitrust) law is the
essential-facilities doctrine. Under both European and US competition rules,
this doctrine can apply to ﬁrms that hold a monopoly in a critical stage of
production in an industry, a "bottleneck", but which faces actual or potential
competition in other stages of production. Under the doctrine, such ﬁrms
may sometimes be obliged to "provide access", which has the implication that
the monopoly must sell services produced in the bottleneck stage to its rivals
at a ”non-discriminatory” price. Typically, the critical stage is an infrastruc-
ture, such as a port, a telecom network or a rail network. In such industries,
industry-speciﬁc regulation often stipulates that access should be granted.
Such speciﬁc access regimes are largely independent of the requirements that
may follow from general competition law and the essential-facilities doctrine.
Independently of the basis for the requirement of access, a critical is-
sue is at which price such transactions should take place. According to the
eﬃcient component pricing rule, advocated by some economists, the monop-
olist should be compensated for forgone monopoly proﬁts (Willig, 1979). In
practice, some kind of fully distributed (backward-looking) cost pricing that
does not compensate for lost monopoly proﬁts have typically been used by
the regulators. Backward-looking cost based price regulation, however, have
well-known disadvantages. In particular, backward-looking regulation gives
weak incentives for cost control. This has triggered a move towards forward-
looking cost-based pricing, e.g., LRIC (forward-looking long-run incremental
costs).
The pricing issue has received a lot of attention from economists, see, e.g.,
the discussion in Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, chapters 3 and 4). There exists
a large literature on how to set prices in a static asymmetric-information
context, where the main focus is the trade-oﬀ between rent extraction, risk
allocation and incentives for cost reduction (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). An
important innovation, from a practical point of view, was the introduction of
price-cap regulation in Britain in the early 1980s. Under price-cap regulation,
1any cost savings that can be achieved will increase the proﬁt of the regulated
ﬁrm. This is in contrast with cost-based price regulation, under which cost
savings must be passed on to the consumers (Armstrong et al, 1994).
The question when an obligation to provide access should be imposed
has primarily been analysed in the law literature,1 while in the economics
literature, the analysis has typically been based on the implicit assumption
that the access price should be regulated. As far as industry-speciﬁcr e g u l a -
tion is concerned, whether or not there should be an access-price regulation
is decided by the legislative bodies, i.e., in a political process. Given that
it has been established that a regulation is desirable, the regulation can in
principle be tailored to the particular characteristics of the industry at hand.
In generally applicable law, however, it is important to have robust and pre-
dictable criteria for when a certain obligation is eﬀective; such criteria have
been developed within the essential-facilities doctrine.
2 The essential-facilities doctrine
The essential-facilities doctrine is not a piece of law in itself. Rather, it is
a systematic interpretation of how the courts haw applied European com-
petition law and American antitrust law in a particular class of situations.
Roughly speaking: when there exists a suﬃciently severe bottleneck prob-
lem, extraordinary obligations (i.a., the obligation to provide access) will be
imposed on the dominant ﬁrm. The legal basis for these obligations is, in
Europe, the prohibition against abuse of a dominant position, i.e., Article
82 of the EC Treaty, and its correspondence in national legislation. This
prohibition imposes obligations on dominant ﬁrms that smaller ﬁrms do not
have, i.e., it is an asymmetric regulation. In the US, the legal basis for the
essential-facilities doctrine is Section 2 of the Sherman Act, under which it
is unlawful to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a market.2
The conclusion of the legal literature, based on a large number of court
1For a survey and analysis, see Bergman (2001).
2Several ﬁrms that jointly control a bottleneck may also fall under the essential facilities
doctrine. In the US, the legal basis for the doctrine would then be Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, under which conspiracies in restraint of trade are unlawful. In Europe, the legal basis
would still normally be Article 82, but it is concievable that Article 81, which prohibits
agreements that restricts competition, could also be applicable. See Bergman (2001) for
details.
2rulings, is that the essential-facilities doctrine is applicable if i) there exists
one facility (one infrastructure) only, ii) access to this facility is necessary in
order to compete in a related market (e.g., the downstream services market),
iii) competing ﬁrms lack a realistic ability to duplicate the facility and iv) it
is possible for the monopoly to provide access.
Of these criteria, the most critical is perhaps the third: that compet-
ing ﬁrms lack a realistic ability to duplicate the facility. Depending on how
this criterion is interpreted, the essential-facilities doctrine could have far-
reaching eﬀects, or it could be applicable only in very particular circum-
stances; an expenditure that is quite reasonable for one ﬁrm may be unrea-
sonable for another ﬁrm. An extreme stand-point would be that in order
for a facility to be essential, it must be impossible to duplicate it. However,
all physical facilities can be duplicated at some cost. Whether a facility is
duplicable or not is always, or almost always, determined by economic or le-
gal considerations, rather than by the laws of nature.3 Hence, it is normally
recognised that it is not necessary to demonstrate that a facility cannot be
duplicated in a physical sense. Another extreme stand-point is that the doc-
trine should be applicable as soon as some ﬁrm lack the resources to duplicate
the facility. In the American case Hecht v. Pro Football, the following state-
ment appeared: ”To be ’essential’ a facility need not be indispensable; it is
suﬃcient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if
denial of its use inﬂicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants.”4
In the Bronner case, the EC Court addressed more or less directly the
question for whom it should be not be realistic to duplicate the facility, and
exactly how ”not realistic” should be interpreted.5 The Court’s statements
can be interpreted in the following way: When analysing a market, take the
actual level of technology and the actual demand as given. Assume then a hy-
pothetical situation in this market, where supply is provided by a symmetric
duopoly. If each of the two ﬁrms’ combined proﬁt in the infrastructural mar-
ket and in the related potentially competitive market would be non-negative,
3A possible exception may be radio spectrum. However, it appears that for practical
purposes, the availability of radio spectrum is mainly determined by government decisions
concerning, i.a., military use of the spectrum.
4Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978).
5C-7/97; Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG vs. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-
verlag GmbH & Co. KG et al. See Bergman (2000) for a more elaborate discussion of the
Bronner case.
3then the essentials facilities doctrine is not applicable. If, on the other hand,
it would not be possible for a ﬁrm with half of the market to set up its own
facility (infrastructure), and earn a non-negative proﬁt, then the doctrine is
applicable. That is, the doctrine is applicable if a symmetric duopoly with
two vertically integrated ﬁrms is not economically viable.
The Bronner criterion has a natural attractiveness. It is relatively easy
to understand and it seems intuitively appealing to oblige a monopoly to
share its infrastructure with its rivals only as a last recourse, when there is
no hope that competition could evolve in the absence of such an obligation.
Similarly, it appears reasonable not to impose such an obligation when there
is a prospect for a suﬃciently dedicated entrant to set up a proﬁtable rivalling
infrastructure.
However, a short-coming of the essential-facilities doctrine is that it is not
based on an ex ante perspective. That such a perspective is desirable has
indirectly been recognized in the law literature. For example, Areeda (1990)
has proposed that the doctrine should only be applied when its application
is likely to increase competition substantially, and that it should not be ap-
plied when its application is likely to reduce the incentives for investments.
Similarly, in the literature on the appropriate level of the access price, it
is recognised that there is a trade oﬀ between intense ex post competition
(through low access prices) and ex ante competition in investments (through
higher access prices).6 In an analysis of telecom regulation, Hausman (1999)
addresses this issue in a real-options setting. He derives the mark-up above
the so-called TSLRIC (Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost) that es-
tablishes the correct incentives for invesetments. Even so, it seems that the
ex ante - ex post distinction has rarely been discussed in the context of when
the essential-facilities doctrine should be applied.7
The main contribution of this article is that it analyses the Bronner cri-
terion from an ex ante perspective. Using a stylised model, a conclusion is
6Phrased diﬀerently, there is a trade-oﬀ between static eﬃciency and dynamic eﬃciency.
7Bergman (2001). An interesting study, that do address the conﬂict between incentives
for investments and strong post-investment competition, is Gans (2001). He derives an
access-pricing scheme that induces investment at the socially optimal time, while the
marginal access fee is equal to the marginal cost of providing access. This is achieved
by having the entrant pay a ﬁxed access fee that equals a rising fraction of the cost of
investment. At the socially optimal time of investment, the fraction is exactly equal to one
half. However, the implementation of such a policy is possible only in a full-information
setting.
4that applying the Bronner criterion introduces a double risk of ineﬃcient
regulation. In high-risk new markets, the doctrine may be applied too read-
ily. The incumbent ﬁrm will invest too little, because it will need to share
the fruits of successful investments with its rival. On the other hand, in
slightly more mature markets with lower risk, the doctrine may be applied
too sparingly. The entrant ﬁrm may be forced to invest in an infrastructure
of its own, before this is warranted from a social point of view.
3 The Model
Assume that in order for anything to be produced in an industry, an infras-
tructure must be put in place, and the producing ﬁrm must have access to
the infrastructure. Assume also that once there exists at least one infrastruc-
ture, there are no capacity constraints, but the owner of the infrastructure
can control its use. Implicitly, a constant marginal cost of production is also
assumed. There will be a ﬁxed cost for building an infrastructure.
The timing of the game to be analysed is the following. A number of
parameters are provided by nature, including a distribution from which the
level of demand will later be drawn. These parameters are known to the
two possible entrants. In addition, the regulator (the government or the
courts) have decided how to interpreted the access rules - or the essential-
facilities doctrine. In particular, the market participants will be aware of
when the access rules (the doctrine) will be applicable and what access price
the regulator will then impose. To simplify the analysis, I assume that access
will have to be provided at average cost. This means that the regulator’s
choice set is reduced to choosing between the two regimes "access" and "non-
access".
Then, in the ﬁrst stage of the game, one ﬁrm (the incumbent) is given
the opportunity to invest in infrastructure. After that, the level of demand
is realised and the access rules are interpreted - i.e., the second ﬁrm (the en-
trant) will learn whether or not it can claim access according to the essential-
facilities doctrine. In the second stage, the entrant will decide whether or
not to build its own infrastructure. Finally, the market will be realised and
the ﬁrms will be awarded their proﬁts.
The level of demand will not be realised until one infrastructure has been
built. Hence, if ﬁrm 1 chooses not to invest, the level of demand will not be
known when ﬁrm 2 makes its decision. If it invests, the level of demand is
5realised and then ﬁrm 1 is again given the option to invest, but it will now
have the position of an entrant, while ﬁrm 2 is the incumbent. The solution
to this problem is identical to the initial problem; hence it will not be further
addressed. (The entrant’s proﬁt will never be higher than the incumbent’s
proﬁt.)








n = m =1
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(1)
where D is a realisation of a measure of demand drawn from a distribution
function f(D). Possibly, this distribution can be degenerate so that there
is no uncertainty and, hence, D is known with certainty. The number of
producing ﬁrms is given by n =0 ,1,2, while m =0 ,1,2 is the number of
installed infrastructures, F is the cost of building an infrastructure and α and
β are constants. Assume that α>1,r e ﬂecting that welfare is higher under
duopoly than under monopoly, for a given number of infrastructures (e.g.,
because of less deadweight loss), and that 1 <β<2,r e ﬂecting that less of
the cost of duplicating the infrastructure, eﬃciency and welfare will increase
if there is competition also in the infrastructure.8 In order to ascertain that
investment will be socially beneﬁcial, assume that E[D] − F>0.
The proﬁt of the ”incumbent” ﬁrm, or the ﬁrst ﬁrm to invest in infras-
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(2)
where γ,γ < 1 reﬂects the share of consumer surplus that the monopoly
can capture. The constant δ, δ < 1/(2αβ),r e ﬂects that each ﬁrm’s proﬁt
under duopoly is less than half of the monopoly proﬁt and that total industry
proﬁt is always lower under duopoly than under monopoly. The above proﬁt
expression builds on the assumption that if there are two ﬁrms, they have
8The alternative n =1 ,m=2is not considered, as this would never be the outcome
of proﬁt maximising. The condition that β<2 implies that at least for some levels of
demand, welfare is maximised if only one infrastructure is built.
6equal marginal costs, they share the cost of the infrastructure in proportion to
their respective output and, because of the symmetry, will get equal market
shares. The proﬁto fﬁrm 2 (as well as that of ﬁrm 1) is therefore given by
row three and four in eq. (2).
The ﬁrms’ objectives are to maximise proﬁts, they are assumed to be risk
neutral and they behave non-cooperatively.
4A n a l y s i s
4.1 Social optimum
I begin the analysis by looking at the socially optimal solution, given that the
regulator can only chose between "access" and "non-access". In particular,
the regulator cannot directly set the ﬁrms’ quantities or prices. However, it
can induce the ﬁrms to operate, even if this results in negative proﬁts, for
example by providing subsidies.
From eq.(1), note that welfare is non-decreasing in D.S i n c e α>1,a s
soon as there is one infrastructure, both ﬁrms should be allowed to enter
the market. If there is no uncertainty, welfare maximisation requires that an
infrastructure is installed if D>1
αF. With uncertainty, an infrastructure
should be installed if E[D] > 1
αF.9 Without uncertainty, two infrastructures
should be installed if welfare is higher with two infrastructures than with
one or zero, i.e., if D ≥ 1
α(β−1)F.10 Since there is no uncertainty when the
investment decision of ﬁrm 2 is made, this condition applies in the second
stage also when there is initial uncertainty. However, this opportunity for ad-
ditional welfare increases the value of building the ﬁrst infrastructure under
uncertainty. Given that the upper support for the distribution of D is higher
than 1
α(β−1)F, the threshold criterion for making the ﬁrst infrastructural in-
vestment is reduced. I.e., if it is the case that for some high realisations of
9Disregarding the option value that accrue to the possibility of investing in an additional
infrastructure, should the demand turn out to be suﬃciently high.
10From the assumptions, it follows that when welfare is higher with two infrastructures
than with one, then it is also the case that two infrastructures are preferable to none. This
can be shown as follows.
Given that:
W(D,2,2) − W(D,1,1) = αβD − 2F − (αD − F)=αD(β − 1) − F>0,
and that 1 <β<2, it follows that W(D,1,1) = αD − F>α D (β − 1) − F>0.
From the initial assumption, it follows that W(D,2,2) > 0.
7demand, it will be proﬁtable to build two infrastructures, then the ﬁrst in-
vestment should be made if D ≥ µ 1
α(β−1)F,f o rs o m eµ<1,w h e r eµ depends
on f(D).
The socially optimal outcome is illustrated in Figure 1 by the thick seg-
ments of four lines. These four lines represents welfare for the four combina-
tions of n and m in eq. (1). For low realisations of demand, no infrastructure
gives the highest welfare (0). For higher levels of demand, welfare is max-
imised with two ﬁrms using one infrastructure. When demand is higher still,
two infrastructures and two competing ﬁrms gives the highest welfare. Note
that one ﬁrm and one infrastructure is never optimal.
4.2 Constrained optimum under certainty
Note that the above analysis is made under the assumption that the ﬁrms can
be subsidised, if they earn negative proﬁts. It is also assumed that the social
cost of public funds equal the nominal cost. Alternatively, it can be assumed
that welfare should be maximised under the constraint that no public funds




st π1,π2 ≥ 0,
n,m ⊂ {0,1,2} (4)
where W(D,n,m) is given by eq. (1) and πi is given by eq. (2). The
solution to this problem is characterised by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under certainty, constrained welfare is maximised
if
n = m =0
n = m =1
n =2 ,m=1
n = m =2
if
π1(D,1,1) < 0
π1(D,1,1) ≥ 0 and π1(D,2,1) < 0
π1(D,2,1) ≥ 0 and
[αD(β − 1) − F<0 or π1(D,2,2) < 0]
π1(D,2,2) ≥ 0 and αD(β − 1) − F ≥ 0
Proof.
Line 1. By assumption, π1(D,1,1) >π 1(D,n,m),f o r(n,m) 6=
(1,1). Hence, if π1(D,1,1) < 0,t h e nπ1(D,n,m) < 0 for all n,m.
8It follows that the only alternative that satisﬁes the no-subsidy
constraint when π1(D,1,1) < 0 is n = m =0 .
Line 2. From eq. (1), we know that for all D, W(D,2,1) >
W(D,1,1). Hence, n = m =1can only be optimal if π1(D,2,1) <
0 (and π1(D,1,1 ≥ 0).B y c o m p a r i n g e q .( 1 ) w i t h e q .( 2 ) ,
we see that W(D,1,1) >π 1(D,1,1). Hence, if π1(D,1,1) > 0,
then W(D,1,1) >W(D,0,0). Furthermore, it can never be the
case that π1(D,2,2) ≥ 0, while π1(D,2,1) < 0. To see this,
note that if π1(D,2,1) < 0,t h e n2π1(D,2,2) − 2π1(D,2,1) =
2(αβγδD − F) − 2(αγδD − 1
2F)=2 [ αγδD(β − 1) − 1
2F] <
2[αγδD − 1
2F]=2 π1(D,2,1) < 0.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption that β<2 and
since all parameters and D have non-negative values.
Line 3.We know already that if π1(D,2,1) ≥ 0,t h e nn = m =0
or n = m =1can never be optimal. Subtracting W(D,2,2)
from W(D,2,1), we see that W(D,2,2) <W(D,2,1) if αD(β −
1) − F<0. Hence, if the last inequality is satisﬁed, it is not
optimal to choose n = m =2 . Finally, if π1(D,2,2) < 0,t h e nb y
assumption we cannot choose n = m =2 .
Line 4. It follows from the proof of Line 3 that Line 4 holds.♦
Intuitively, Proposition 1 is easy to understand. As soon as it is proﬁtable
for a monopoly ﬁrm to enter the market, welfare is higher under entry than
under non-entry. As soon as two ﬁrms can proﬁtably use the same infras-
tructure, the monopoly should be forced to provide access; hence, creating a
duopoly. However, it is not the case that both ﬁrms should be required to
provide their own infrastructure, as soon as this yields non-negative proﬁts.
Instead, if proﬁts are non-negative in an infrastructural duopoly, then the
beneﬁt from the additional infrastructure should be compared with the cost
of providing an additional infrastructure. Only if the beneﬁt is greater than
t h ec o s t( w h i l es i m u l t a n e o u s l yp r o ﬁts are non-negative) shall the infrastruc-
ture be duplicated. Ignoring the right-most solid lines in the upper and lower
part of the ﬁgure, the situation is illustrated in Figure 2. Welfare is shown
in the upper part of the ﬁgure and proﬁti ss h o w ni nt h el o w e rp a r t .S i n c e
proﬁts are constrained to be non-negative, maximum welfare cannot always
be achieved. Hence, when ﬁrm proﬁt for a certain combination of m and n
9increases and reaches zero, welfare may jump up discontinuously. (For the
discrete jump down, see the discussion in the next subsection.)
We postpone the discussion of the optimal policy under uncertainty. How-
ever, we can note already at this point that there exists a possible time-
consistency problem. Given that welfare is always higher when two ﬁrms
use a single infrastructure, than when there is a monopoly, the regulator will
always want to require access. However, under uncertainty, such a policy
may deter the incumbent from investing.
4.3 The access rules
Based on the criterion formulated in the Bronner case, if the second ﬁrm
wishes to enter the market, the incumbent ﬁrm (the owner of the infras-
tructure) may be required to sell infrastructure access at a price equal to
average cost. Such an obligation will be imposed if the entrant could not
earn a proﬁt if it builds its own infrastructure, even if it captured half of the
market. Formally, the incumbent will be required to provide access if
π2(D,2,2) = αβγδD − F<0 (5)
The price paid for access is implicitly given by equation (2) - it will equal
the average costs.
Proﬁt maximising behaviour under certainty
The market outcome is derived backwards, starting in the second stage.
Stage 2
Given that the entrant has to build its own infrastructure, it will enter
t h em a r k e ti fαβγδD − F>0. In this case, entry will be proﬁtable and the
essential-facilities doctrine cannot be called upon. The entrant will want to
use the incumbent’s infrastructure if αγδD − 1
2F>0, but it will only be
allowed to do so, if it cannot proﬁtably build its own infrastructure, i.e., if




F Do not enter (6)
1
2αγδ
F ≤ D ≤
1
αβγδ
F Enter without infrastructure
1
αβγδ
F<D Enter with infrastructure
10Let R be the response of ﬁrm 2
Stage 1
Assume ﬁrst that there is no uncertainty. Then, given that ﬁrm 1 builds
an infrastructure and given the strategy chosen by ﬁrm 2 as shown by equa-















Because of the assumed symmetry between the ﬁrms, we know already
that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt will be non-negative if the conditions of the second or
third line hold. According to the ﬁrst line, its proﬁt will be non-negative if
γD− F>0, i.e., if D>1





that ﬁrm 1 will invest if γD− F>0.
Proposition 2. If 1+βγδ−β ≥ 0 and under certainty, the Bron-
ner criterion results in the same industry structure and the same
output as would follow from constrained welfare maximisation.
If 1+βγδ − β<0, welfare may be lower than the constrained
maximum. However, under certainty the Bronner criterion will
not deter the incumbent from making welfare-improving invest-
ments that would have been made in the absence of the essential-
facilities doctrine.
Proof
According to eq. (5), the Bronner criterion obliges the incumbent
to provide access if π2(D,2,2) = αβγδD − F<0.A c c o r d i n gt o
Proposition 1, the optimal policy prescribes that access should
be provided if π2(D,2,2) < 0 or if αD(β − 1) − F<0.I f
π2(D,2,2) ≥ 0 implies that αD(β−1)−F ≥ 0, then the Bronner
criterion results in the constrained welfare maximum. Note that
both π2(D,2,2) and αD(β − 1) − F are increasing in D (since
β>1).L e t D∗be such that π2(D∗,2,2) = 0,i . e . ,t h el e v e lo f
demand that is needed for both ﬁrms to break even with their
own infrastructure. Let e D be such that αe D(β − 1) − F =0 , i.e.,
the level of demand where duplication of the infrastructure gives
the same welfare as no duplication and access. If D∗ ≥ e D,t h e n
π2(D,2,2) ≥ 0 implies that αD(β − 1) − F ≥ 0. The explicit
11expressions for D∗ and e D are D∗ = 1
αβγδF and e D = 1
α(β−1)F.
Hence, D∗ ≥ e D if 1
αβγδF ≥ 1
α(β−1)F, i.e., if 1+βγδ−β ≥ 0.O nt h e
other hand, if D∗ < e D, there exists some b D, such that D∗ < b D<
e D. W h e nd e m a n di sg i v e nb yb D, the Bronner criterion implies
that the incumbent is not required to provide access. However,
the entrant will enter, since this is proﬁtable even if the ﬁrm has
to build its own infrastructure. On the other hand, since b D<e D,
welfare is lower under duplication of the infrastructure than it
would be under mandatory access.
For the last part of the proposition, note that in the absence of ac-
cess rules, the incumbent invests if π1(D,1,1) ≥ 0.L e tD0 be the
level of demand where π1(D0,1,1) = 0. From eq. (2) it is evident
that D0 <D ∗. Hence, when demand is lower than D∗,t h ei n c u m -
bent is certain that there will be no entry, while for higher levels
of demand, there will be entry with duplication of the infrastruc-
ture. Assume instead that the essential-facilities doctrine applies
under the set of circumstances described by the Bronner criterion.
When demand is equal to or higher than D∗, the entrant will have
to build its own infrastructure, just as in the absence of access
rules. When demand is lower than D∗, the incumbent may have
to share its infrastructure. However, the entrant will not enter
unless it earns a non-negative proﬁt. Due to the assumed sym-
metry, the incumbent will also earn a non-negative proﬁti ft h e r e
is entry. If there is no entry, the incumbent’s proﬁt will be same
as if there were no access rules. Hence, the incumbent will not
be deterred from making investments by the access rules.♦
The ”Bronner” access rules allow the second ﬁrm to use the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s
infrastructure when ﬁxed costs are high relative to the level of demand. Given
that the ﬁrms are not given subsidies and under certainty, this is optimal from
an ex ante perspective. The incumbent is not deterred from investing by the
access requirement and the entrant enters as soon as that is proﬁtable.
However, according to the access rules, the second ﬁrm may have to install
its own infrastructure too early, i.e., if 1
αβγδF<D .T h ee ﬀect is illustrated
by the discontinuous jump down of the right-most solid line segment in the
upper part of Figure 2. Here, the beneﬁt of competition in infrastructures is
not large enough to oﬀ-set the social cost of duplicating the infrastructure.
12Comparing the optimality condition for installing the second infrastruc-
ture, 1
α(β−1)F<D , with the actual rule, we see that there is a discrepancy
between the two rules. Only when β = 1
1−γδ w i l lt h et w or u l e sh a v et h eﬁrm
invest at the same minimal level of demand. For relatively small values of β,
β< 1
1−γδ (i.e., when the gross beneﬁt from duplicating the infrastructure is
small), the entrant will be forced to invest in its own infrastructure too early.
For relatively large values of β, it would be socially optimal to duplicate the
infrastructure for lower levels of demand than what is required. However,
this would force both ﬁrms to run a loss and would, hence, require subsidies.
In conclusion, the access rules allows entry in the downstream (service provi-
sion) market at the right level of demand, but they may force the incumbent
to enter the infrastructure market too early.
Proﬁt maximising behaviour under uncertainty
Assume instead that there is uncertainty and assume that the realisation
of actual demand is drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval
[D,D]. The above analysis is still valid for the second stage. However, the
ﬁrst-stage behaviour will depend on the level of uncertainty. In particular,
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3. Under uncertainty, access rules based on the Bron-
ner criterion may deter welfare-improving investments.
Proof
It suﬃces with an example to demonstrate the proposition. Let
α =1 .2, γ =0 .5, δ =1 /3, F =2and E[D]=4 .5.L e t D =
E[D] − s and let D = E[D]+s.I t i s w e l f a r e i m p r o v i n g t o
invest with expected demand at this level; W(4.5,1,1) = 2.5 and
W(4.5,2,1) = 3.4. Without uncertainty, it would be privately
proﬁtable for the incumbent ﬁrm to invest, since E[π1]=E[γD−
F]=γE[D] − F =0 .25. The entrant would not enter, since
π1 = π2 = −0.1 in a duopoly. Similarly, if there were uncertainty
but if there were no access rules, the expected proﬁt would still
be 0.25,s i n c ep r o ﬁt is then (by assumption) linear in the realised
demand. However, if we introduce uncertainty as previously and
given the existence of access rules, the expected proﬁto fﬁrm 1
13is given by:












x − 1)dx)/2s =
=( 0 .2125 + 0.15s − 0.15s
2)/2s
Evaluating the expression shows that the incumbent’s proﬁt will
become negative for s ' 1.79. For example, when s =2 ,t h e
expected proﬁto fﬁrm 1 will be −0.021875. When the expected
proﬁt is negative, the incumbent will not invest in infrastructure.
This, in turn, will result in an expected welfare loss of 2.5,r e l a t i v e
to a situation without access rules.♦
The intuition for Proposition 3 is the following: In favourable (high de-
mand) states of the nature, the incumbent will have to share its proﬁts with
the entrant. However, in unfavourable (low demand) states of nature, it will
have to bear the full investment cost itself. Such a regulation will of course
reduce the incumbent’s expected proﬁta n dr e d u c et h ei n c e n t i v e st oi n v e s t .
Consequently, a higher level of expected demand is needed in order to make
an investment proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ei n c u m b e n t .
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Ideally, the essential-facilities doctrine should prescribe access in such a way
that welfare-improving investments are not deterred, while encouraging com-
petition in the downstream market, in order that eﬃcient use is made of
the existing infrastructure. Furthermore, welfare-improving duplications of
the infrastructure should be stimulated, while welfare-reducing duplications
should be avoided.
The Bronner criterion for when the essential-facilities doctrine can be
applied have the advantage of being well deﬁned and conceptually relatively
easy to understand. It appears also to have a ”natural appeal”. When
only one ﬁrm is capable of building an infrastructure it must, according to
the Bronner criterion, share this infrastructure with its competitors. Once
there is an economic possibility for a competitor to duplicate the facility, this
obligation is lifted.
14However, the analysis in section 3 showed that this criterion may result
in ineﬃciencies, for at least two reasons:
First, if there is substantial uncertainty as to the level of future demand
for services based on the infrastructure and if the expected proﬁtability is
relatively low even for a monopoly, the obligation to share the infrastructure
with a rival can make it unproﬁtable for the incumbent to invest in the
ﬁrst place. This investment-deterring eﬀect can reduce welfare, relative to a
monopolised market.
Second, the limitation of the doctrine to situations where duplication of
infrastructure is not economically viable may force the entrant to invest too
much (in too small a market), from a welfare point-of-view. When duplication
of infrastructure is just marginally viable, it can be more eﬃcient to maintain
the obligation for the incumbent to allow access.
Consequently, the essential-facilities doctrine should be applied according
to a set of criteria such that i) when access is mandated, welfare is higher
under access than under duplication of infrastructure, unless ii) a rational
agent, taking the access requirement into consideration, would be deterred
from making the initial investment. Naturally, the entrant will only claim
access when doing so is proﬁtable. The drawback with such a rule is that
it would have to rely both on the level of demand uncertainty before the
investment was made and on the consumer surplus under the diﬀerent regimes
considered. In contrast, the Bronner criterion is based only on the ﬁrms’
proﬁts under the diﬀerent regimes.
In fact, unless such information is available, it is not even possible to de-
termine whether an inﬁnitesimal modiﬁcation of the Bronner criterion would
improve welfare. This can be illustrated with a simple example. Let D” be
the lowest level of demand where the entrant ﬁnds entry with access prof-
itable. Assume that the Bronner criterion is modiﬁed so that entry is only
allowed if demand is higher than D”+ε, for some small ε.I f t h e r e i s n o
uncertainty, this modiﬁcation reduces welfare, according to proposition 2.
The reason is that welfare is always higher with two active ﬁrms than with
just one, while investments are never deterred under certainty. However, if
there is uncertainty, it follows from proposition 3 that the modiﬁcation may
improve welfare. This will be the case if the modiﬁcation makes it proﬁtable
for the incumbent to make a welfare-improving investment that would have
been deterred otherwise.
Despite this, a tentative suggestion is that the level of uncertainty prior to
15the incumbent’s investments should be taken into consideration. When there
is little uncertainty, the applicability of the essential-facilities doctrine may
be expanded, relative to the Bronner criterion. When the ex ante uncertainty
is high, on the other hand, the applicability of the doctrine should be reduced.
More speciﬁcally, when the level of uncertainty is low, the doctrine may be
applied even if a symmetric infrastructure-and-services duopoly would be
marginally proﬁtable. Furthermore, when the level of uncertainty is high,
the doctrine should not be applied if the ﬁrms in a symmetric dupoly with
access to a single infrastructure would only make a small proﬁt. The proposed
ranges of applicaton are schematically represented in Figure 3.
Note that if uncertainty is suﬃciently high, it follows that the essential-
facilities doctrine should not be applied at all. In a sense, this has been
recognised in legal practice: it has been claimed that the doctrine should
be applied more sparingly in relation to intellectual property.11 Ar a t i o n a l e
for this claim is that the level of uncertainty is typically higher for R&D
investments, than for investments in physical assets.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that application of the
doctrine to intellectual property would normally not imply that the entrant
could use the intellectual property (patent, et cetera) for free. Instead, the
natural interpretation is that the entrant would pay a license fee, such that
if the entrant had half the market, it would pay half of the net present
value of the R&D investment. If, on the contrary, the entrant could use the
intellectual property for free, it is obvious that investment incentives would
be drastically reduced.
The analysis presented in this paper is related to that of Hausman (1999).
Hausman assumes that access prices are always regulated and then derives
an access-pricing formula that gives the incumbent ﬁrm the correct incentives
to invest. In his model, higher uncertainty will result in a higher mark-up
above the (ex post) cost of providing access. Hausman makes assumptions
on realistic parameter values for the telecom industry and calculates the
optimal mark-up; according to his estimate, a mark-up of approximately 3.3
over costs should be applied to the investment cost component of providing
access. In the present paper, it is assumed that the access price will be set
equal to the (ex post) cost of providing access, while instead the incumbent
will only sometimes have an obligation to provide access. Although these are
alternative ways of compensating the incumbent for the ex ante investment
11Ritter et al. (1991), pp. 310-312, and Glasl (1994).
16risks, the analysis of this paper follows more closely the logic of the essential-
facilities doctrine.
An issue that is not analysed in this paper, but which is a possible subject
for future research, is the risk that the entrant will not be able to reach a
symmetric market position, i.e., a similar proﬁtl e v e la st h ei n c u m be n t .U n d e r
the Bronner criterion, no explicit account is taken for this risk. Hence, the
competitive situation of the entrant may be such that it would make a proﬁt
if it attracted half of the customers and obtained half of the industry proﬁt,
while it in practice has no reasonable chance of doint so.
Another topic for future research are the incentives for, and the eﬀect of,
collusion.
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Fig. 3. Actual applicability of the essential facilities doctrine (the ”Bronner range”) and 
suggested ranges of applicability under high and low uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 